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TAXATION - Co~STITQ'TIONAL LAw - PowER OF CONGRESS To EXEMPT
FEDERAL INSTRUMENTALITIES FROM TAXATION -The Home Owners' Loan
Corporation 1 instituted a mandamus proceeding against the clerk of the superior
court of the city of Baltimore to compel the recording of a mortgage upon payment of the ordinary recording charge and without affixing stamps in com-

1 Set up by authority of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 48 Stat. L. 128
(1933), 12 U.S. C. (1934), § 1461 et seq.
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pliance with the state recording tax. 2 The lending process of the HOLC is
expressly declared by Congress to be exempt from taxation.3 Held, the tax is
invalid in so far as it purports to cover the lending process. All justices concurred. Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 308 U. S. 21, 60 S. Ct. 15

(1939).
With every judicial constriction upon the doctrine of intergovernmental
tax immunity, one question becomes of increasing importance, namely-whether,
and to what extent, Congress is empowered to provide for the instrumentalities
it creates or selects for the execution of governmental powers an immunity from
taxation greater in scope than that which the courts will imply. This question
was expressly left open in the Graves v. O'Keefe. 4 The Pittman case presented
it squarely. 6 Chief Justice Hughes, in sustaining the exemption, does not depart
from the traditional attitude of the judiciary toward legislative exemptions. 6
Proceeding upon the assumption that the HOLC is a constitutional exercise of
Congressional authority, the Court treats the exemption as an exercise of the
power to preserve, which comes within the range of the "necessary and proper
clause." 1 Although the decision sets at rest speculation as to the Court's stand
upon express exemptions in the light of the drastic restrictions upon the scope of
the implied immunity, it adds little to an understanding of the constitutional basis
Md. Laws (Spec. Sess. 1937), c. II, p. 30; Code (Supp.), art. 81, § 213.
Sec. 4(c) of the Home Owners' Loan Act, 48 Stat. L. 129 (1933), 12 U.S. C.
(1934), § 1463(c).
4
306 U. S. 466 at 478-479, 59 S, Ct. 595 (1939), where it was stated:
''Whether its [Congress'] power to grant exemptions as an incident to the exercise
of powers specifi:cally granted by the Constitution can ever, in any circumstances, extend
beyond the constitutional immunity of federal agencies which courts have implied, is
a question which need not now be determined." See 37 M1cH. L. REV. 1079 (1939).
6
Counsel, after arguing that the mortgage tax was not one from which the
HOLC would be constitutionally exempt, contended that if the act of Congress be
construed as conferring immunity, it went beyond the power of Congress, as Congress
cannot grant immunity of greater extent than the constitutional immunity. It would
seem that counsel were correct in concluding that the tax in question was not one from
which the HOLC would be impliedly exempt, since it is revenue-producing, nonregulatory, non-discriminatory and fails to place an undue burden upon the HOLC.
See RoTTSCHAEFFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 107 et seq. (1939).
6
"The power [in Congress to exempt its agencies from state taxation], like the
power to consent to taxation, has so generally been taken for granted that when Congress has spoken the problem has usually been treated simply as one of statutory construction." 49 HARv. L. REv. 1323 at 1330 (1936). Ambrosini v. United States,
187 U. S. 1, 23 S. Ct. I (1902); McCurdy v. United States, 246 U. S. 263, 38
S. Ct. 289 (1918); Baltimore Nat. Bank v. State Tax Comm. of Md., 297 U. S.
209, 56 S. Ct. 417 (1936). "And it is significant that the Court has never upheld a
state tax on any federal agency to which Congress had specifically granted exemption."
Stoke, "State Taxation and the New Federal Instrumentalities," 22 lowA L. REV.
39 at 43 (1936).
1 U. S. Constitution, art. 1, § 8, cl. 18. The Court significantly remarks that in
the exercise of this power to protect the lawful activities of its agencies, Congress has
the dominant authority which necessarily inheres in its action within the national
field. Principal case, 308 U. S. at 33.
2

3

740

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 38

of Congress' power to exempt and the extent of this power. 8 Implied immunity is
generally considered as representing the implied will of Congress; 9 express
Congressional exemptions are justified constitutionally as necessary and proper
for maintaining the full efficiency of the instrumentality in its execution of
governmental powers. 10 Proceeding upon this premise, a restriction upon the
scope of implied immunity has no necessary relation to the scope of Congress'
power expressly to provide for immunity. In addition, this conception of the
interrelation of express and implied immunity admits of the construction that
the state taxation which the courts will allow must be by an implied Congressional grant. 11 This aspect of the problem is not without difficulty.12 Again,
it has been suggested that the courts have, in outlining the doctrines of implied
immunity, indicated the full extent of Congress' power to declare exemptions.18
Advocates of this theory must explain the dicta in those cases which expressly
admit the power in Congress to grant an immunity which the courts will not
imply.14 However, it is agreed that Congress' power in this respect is not with8 See Schweppe, "State Taxation of National Bank Stocks: Uncertainty of Its
Constitutional Basis," 6 MrnN. L. REv. 219 (1922).
9 "Yet it should be pointed out that in all of these cases in which the Court
upheld the application of a state tax • . . no specific exemption from taxation was
involved. The Court was feeling its way in the absence of statutory direction, and
was merely giving its own construction of the effects of state taxation upon the services
performed by the agent for the federal government.•.•" Stoke, "State Taxation and
the New Federal Instrumentalities," 22 lowA L. REv. 39 at 43 (1936); Osborn v.
Bank of. United States, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738 (1824); 49 HARv. L. REV. 1323 at
1330 (1936).
10 See Corwin, "The Power of Congress to Tax Income From State and Municipal
Bonds," 13 NAT. MuN. REv. 51 (1924).
11 "The statutory immunity of national banks from every form of state taxation
other than that assented to by Congress is now based on the dubious theory that they
would be completely immune from state taxation but for such assent." ROTTScHAEFER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 107-108 (1939), citing Owensboro Nat. Bank v. Owensboro,
173 U.S. 664, 19 S. Ct. 537 (1899).
12 "It is apparent that the theory that the states derive their power to tax national
banks from a grant by Congress cannot be sustained if it means that Congress has
granted a power which is by the Constitution delegated exclusively to the federal
government..•." Traynor, "National Bank Taxation in California," 17 CAL. L. REV.
83 at 88 (1929).
18 4 LEGAL NoTEs ON LocAL GovT. 382 (1939); Stoke, "State Taxation and
the New Federal Instrumentalities," 22 IowA L. REv. 39 at 48 et seq. (1936).
14 "There are some instrumentalities which, though Congress may protect them
from state taxation, will nevertheless be subject to that taxation unless Congress speaks."
Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp., 276 U.S. 575 at 581, 48 S. Ct. 333 (1928). See
also Goudy v. Meath, 203 U. S. 146, 27 S. Ct. 48 (1905); Gromer v. Standard
Dredging Co., 224 U. S. 362, 32 S. Ct. 499 (19II}; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 240 U. S. 319, 36 S. Ct. 298 (1915); Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18
Wall. (85 U.S.) 5 (1873); Choctaw 0. & G. R.R. v. Mackey, 256 U.S. 531, 41
S. Ct. 582 (1920); Central Pac. R. R. v. California, 162 U. S. 91, 16 S. Ct. 766
(1895).
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out limitation.15 It is submitted that the' proper basis of limitation is contained
in Chief Justice Marshall's discussion in McCulloch v. Maryland. 16 Congress'
right to select or create agencies for the execution of its delegated powers was
therein recognized as coming within the scope of the "necessary and proper''
clause.17 Conceivably, then, if Congress should conclude that a tax-exempt instrumentality were necessary and proper to the efficient exercise of governmental
powers, it might so decree.18 The only limitation upon this right rests in the
requirement that the instrumentality so selected be necessary and proper.19
The scope of the implied immunity which courts have developed as representing
Congress' will in the absence of statutory direction is founded upon a more
restrictive definition of necessity than that to which Congress will be held.20
The Supreme Court has always allowed Congress the broadest latitude in the
selec;ion of the means necessary to a proper exercise of its delegated powers. 21
The Pittman case indicates that the Court's attitude in this respect remains unchanged despite the shift in its own idea as to the necessity of tax-exempt instrumentalities. 22

15 National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall. (76 U. S.) 353 at 362 (1869);
Stoke, "State Taxation and the New Federal Instrumentalities," 22 lowA L. REV.
39 at 50 et seq. (1936); 33 ILL. L. REv. 962 (1939).
16 4 Wheat. (17 U. S.) 316 (1819).
17 Ibid., at 409.
18 See Traynor, "National Bank Taxation in California," 17 CAL. L. REv. 83 at
88 et seq. (1929); Bank v. Supervisors, 7 Wall. (26 U. S.) 26 (1869).
19 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U. S.) 316 (1819); Osborn v. Bank
of United States, 9 Wheat. (22 U. S.) 738 (1824); First National Bank v. Fellows,
244 U.S. 416, 37 S. Ct. 734 (1917); Missouri ex rel. Burnes Nat. Bank v. Duncan,
265 U.S. 17, 44 S. Ct. 427 (1924).
20 Note Chief Justice Marshall's discussion of this problem in McCulloch v. Marylandi 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 at 413 (1819); Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust
Co., 255 U.S. 180, 41 S. Ct. 243 (1920).
21 ln Bank v. Supervisors, 7 Wall. (74 U. S.) 26 at 30-31 (1869), the Court
said: "And we think it clearly within the discretion of Congress to determine whether,
in view of all the circumstances attending the issue of the notes, their usefulness as a
means of carrying on the government, would be enhanced by exemption from taxation;
and within the constitutional power of Congress, having resolved the question of usefulness affirmatively, to provide by law for such exemption."
22 It is well to note that the Court's tendency to restrict the scope of the doctrine
of intergovernmental tax immunity may be the result of a changed attitude of the
executive and legislative branches of government in respect thereto. See Cordell Hull's
proposal, while Senator from Tennessee, S. J. Res. 251, 72d Cong., 2d sess., 76 CoNG.
REc. 3588 (1933); President's Message to Congress, April 25, 1938, 83 CoNG. REc.
5683, 5733 (1938).

